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Abstract 
 
At present, nearly 25 percent of all patients experience some variety of adverse event during 
the life cycle of their patient experience in a hospital admission (Kable, et al. 2008). It is 
critical to effectively gain a comprehensive understanding of the types, frequencies, causes 
and consequences of adverse events related to coordination of care between primary and 
specialized health care services in Norway, in order to effective prevent future adverse events. 
This research seeks to determine the primary characterizations of adverse events, as they 
relate to patient transfers between care providers, as well as to identify details and additional 
areas for research associated with these characterizations. The research was accomplished 
through review of adverse event reports using a developed taxonomy to appropriately sort and 
present event occurrences. Within the findings were a number of significant results, including 
a higher propensity for errors associated with improper or inadequate communication, caused 
by multiple causal factors. In utilizing a number of existing taxonomic structures to sort, 
evaluate and classify adverse events, it became apparent that there is no existing taxonomy 
that is fully suited to apply to patient handovers occurring between primary and specialized 
health care providers in Norway, resulting in the need to develop one. Additionally, resulting 
data supported a need for further research and development of best-practice defensive barriers 
to mitigate hazards within patient handovers and care transfers, to better protect against multi-
factorial risks associated with typical adverse events. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Patient safety has become an increasingly important topic of research over the last decade 
(Vincent 2010, Aase 2010), yet the importance of protecting patients from harm is not a new 
idea. As early as 370 B.C., Hippocrates addressed the importance of protecting patients from 
unnecessary complications, stating “Primum non nocere” “First, do no harm”. While the goal 
of medical care is to treat illness without unnecessary harm to the patient, the delivery of such 
care has proved to be inherently risky. In 1964, Schimmel documented the dangers of being 
hospitalized, or “the price we pay for modern diagnosis and therapy,” as he referred to it in 
his report on the Hazards of Hospitalization, with outcomes including drug reactions and 
“untoward effects” of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. In a review of adverse events 
associated with discharge from intensive care settings, Elliot et al. define an adverse event as 
“any unintended harm or injury to a patient, including temporary or permanent disability, 
which is caused by the health care provided rather than the patient’s disease or illness.” 
(Elliott, et al. 2013). At present, nearly 25 percent of all patients experience some variety of 
adverse event during their hospital admission (Kable, et al. 2008), with one in five of those 
events resulting in death, and another 13 percent rendering the patient permanently disabled. 
It is estimated that at least half of these events would have been prevented with an increase in 
standards of care (Baker, et al 2004, DeVries, et al. 2008). 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Transitions between care settings have become an increasingly important topic in patient 
safety research. The World Health Organization (2009) rates lack of communication and 
coordination (including coordination across organizations, discontinuity and handovers) as 
one of the top six research priorities within the field of patient safety for developed countries, 
indicating a need for more research within the area of coordination of care. 
 
Coleman and Boult (2003) define transitional care as “a set of actions designed to ensure the 
coordination and continuity of health care as patients transfer between different locations or 
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different levels of care within the same location” (p. 30). Transitions between primary and 
secondary health care settings have proven to be a high-risk area for patients, and an 
increasing amount of research indicates a correlation between patient handovers and adverse 
events (Forster, et al. 2003, Forster, et al. 2004, Moore, et al. 2003, Kripalani, et al. 2007).  In 
the past, it was common for people to have one doctor, with that doctor responsible for the 
majority of their care. The emphasis on increasing specialization within sub-fields of 
medicine has begun to create the need for cooperation between primary and specialized health 
care providers, as any patients now have (Tahan 2007). This leads to an increase in the 
number of handovers and an increased risk for patients (Wachter 2008).  
 
Patients changing needs have also lead to an increase in transitions. Patients with continuous 
complex care needs frequently require care in multiple settings, and as such are particularly 
vulnerable to poorly executed transitions (Coleman and Boult 2003). Because patient care is 
often fragmented, duplicative, and sometimes disorganized and improperly planned, the risk 
of life threatening medical errors increases as the patients’ exposure within the healthcare 
system increases (Tahan 2006). 
 
In 2009 Norway launched a health care reform focused on coordination of care (called the 
coordination reform). The coordination reform identified three main challenges that it aims to 
solve: 
• Patients’ needs for coordinated services are not being sufficiently met. 
• There are too few initiatives aimed at limiting and preventing disease.  
• The population is developing and range of illnesses among the population are 
changing. 
Examining adverse events, related to coordination of care, can give valuable insight into types 
of failures and their underlying causes. This information can then be used to improve patient 
safety during transitions and offer better continuity of care, an important step in making sure 
that patients’ needs for coordinated care are met at a sufficient level. 
1.2 Aim/Objective 
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The aim of the study is to gain a better understanding of the types, frequency, causes, and 
consequences of adverse events seen in relation to coordination of care between primary and 
secondary health care services in Norway.  
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
Main research question 
What characterizes adverse events in relation to coordination of care between primary and 
secondary health care services? 
 
Supplementary research questions 
• What are the most common types of adverse events reported in relation to 
coordination of care? 
• What are the possible causes of these events? 
• What consequences do these events have for patients? 
• How frequently do these events occur? 
• Is there any notable difference in frequency/types of events reported after the 
coordination reform was put in to place? 
• How reliable are the data on reported adverse events in relation to coordination of 
care? 
 
1.4 Collaborations 
 
This study is a collaboration with a larger patient safety study, Quality and safety within 
elderly health and care services – The role of transitions and interactions (QSEHCS). The 
QSEHCS study has two main objectives: 
1. To understand coordination aspects (transitions and interactions) of significance for 
the quality and safety of elderly health and care services in Norway (Phase 1). 
2. To design and test an evidence-based intervention program to assess the impact of 
transitions/ interactions on quality and safety and to implement improvements within 
transitions/ interactions in elderly health and care services (Phase 2). 
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While the QSEHCS study is primarily focused on the elderly population, the anonymous 
nature of the adverse event reports prevents the ability to use age as a distinguishing factor.  
 
1.5 Limitations 
 
There is a substantial amount of research that indicates an under-reporting of adverse events 
(Bates, et al. 2003). The aim of this study is not to determine the effectiveness of the reporting 
system, but to use reported material as an additional data source to try to gain better insight 
into why the transition between primary and secondary care is a high risk area for patients. As 
such, problems such as reasons for under-reporting adverse events related to coordination of 
care will not be addressed.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
 
In this chapter I will first provide definitions for important terms used in the paper. After that 
I will present previous research that is relevant to the study, models of adverse events, and 
taxonomies used within patient safety. 
 
2.1 Definitions of important terms 
 
Handover 
The definition of a handover can be very broadly interpreted. The Australian Council for 
Safety and Quality in Health Care (2005) define a clinical handover as the transfer of 
information from one health care provider to another when:  
- a patient has a change of location or venue of care, and/or 
- when the care of/responsibility for that patient shifts from one provider to another (p. 5) 
 
For the purpose of this study, a handover refers to the transfer of information that occurs as 
the responsibility for patient care shifts between primary and secondary health care providers. 
 
Coordination of care 
From Closing the Quality Gap: A Critical Analysis of Quality Improvement Strategies, Care 
coordination can be defined as, “the deliberate organization of patient care activities between 
two or more participants (including the patient) involved in a patient's care to facilitate the 
appropriate delivery of health care services. Organizing care involves the marshalling of 
personnel and other resources needed to carry out all required patient care activities, and is 
often managed by the exchange of information among participants responsible for different 
aspects of care.” (McDonald, et al. 2007)  
 
Transitional care 
For the purpose of this study, transitional care is defined as, “A set of actions designed to 
ensure the coordination and continuity of health care as patients transfer between different 
locations or different levels of care within the same location. Representative locations include 
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(but are not limited to) hospitals, sub-acute and post-acute nursing facilities, the patient's 
home, primary and specialty care offices, and long-term care facilities. Transitional care is 
based on a comprehensive plan of care and the availability of health care practitioners who 
are well-trained in chronic care and have current information about the patient's goals, 
preferences, and clinical status. It includes logistical arrangements, education of the patient 
and family, and coordination among the health professionals involved in the transition. 
Transitional care, which encompasses both the sending and the receiving aspects of the 
transfer, is essential for persons with complex care needs”. (Coleman & Boult 2003) 
 
Adverse event 
WHO guidelines for adverse event reporting and learning systems (2005) define an adverse 
event as, “An injury related to medical management, in contrast to complications of disease. 
Medical management includes all aspects of care, including diagnosis and treatment, failure 
to diagnose or treat, and the systems and equipment used to deliver care. Adverse events may 
be preventable or non-preventable.” (p. 8) 
 
2.2 Previous Research 
 
The majority of research is focused on handovers within specialized health care services, and 
there is more focus on handovers relating to hospital discharge than hospital admissions, 
indicating that more research is necessary. 
A review study by Laugaland, Aase and Barach (2011) identified risk factors associated with 
transitions between care settings, which included deficits in communication, poor or lacking 
documentation, adverse drug events, and procedure and test follow-up errors. In addition they 
found that the seriousness of consequences varied and included incorrect treatment, patient 
dissatisfaction, inappropriate use of resources, re-hospitalization, and death. Additionally, the 
study pointed out a lack of studies that measure the actual extent and frequency of adverse 
outcomes effecting patients that are transferred between different care settings. 
 
A study by Moore, et al. (2003) examined the prevalence of rehospitalizations within three 
months after the initial post-discharge outpatient primary care visit. They found that 49% of 
the patients in the study experienced at least one adverse event related to discontinuity of care 
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from the inpatient to outpatient setting. They concluded that the prevalence of medical errors 
due to discontinuity of care is high and may be associated with an increased risk of 
rehospitalization.  
 
Walraven, et al. (2002) conducted a study of the effects of discharge summary availability on 
hospital readmission. They found that only a small number of follow-up physicians had 
received the patient’s discharge summary at the time of the follow-up visit. Additionally they 
found that rehospitalization was more likely when the follow-up physician had not received 
the discharge summary. 
 
A study by Forster, et al. (2004) found that one quarter of the patients involved in the study 
experienced an adverse event after hospital discharge, and that half of these events were 
preventable. Further they found that it is necessary to follow patients more closely after 
discharge in order to prevent adverse events. They suggest that interventions could include 
enhanced communication with community care providers, better integration of home-care 
services with hospital care, hospital-based follow-up clinics, and early telephone contact. 
 
A case study by Gandhi (2005) found that system problems including poor continuity (with 
multiple-provider involvement), lack of communication, and multiple handoffs led to a 
substantial delay in the patient’s diagnosis of tuberculosis. The handoffs in the case were 
particularly notable as they highlighted the issue of diffused responsibility that allowed 
important test results to go unnoticed, ultimately resulting in the patient’s death. Further, 
Gandhi suggests that clear lines of responsibility must be established in order to prevent 
misunderstandings or lapses in patient care when there are multiple care-providers are 
involved. 
 
A study by Coleman, et al. (2004) found that post hospital transitions were common in 
Medicare (aged 65 and older) beneficiaries, and that a significant number of these care 
transitions were considered complicated in nature. They highlight the importance of 
identifying patients who are at risk for complicated care patterns with information available at 
the time of discharge. 
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A review study by Greewald, Denham and Jack (2007) found that routines for hospital 
discharge varied greatly from hospital to hospital and patient to patient, increasing patient risk 
and the number of post discharge adverse events. They suggest that a standardized discharge 
process could decrease the number of adverse events and unnecessary re-hospitalizations.  
 
2.3 Learning from mistakes/Why report? 
 
Learning from previous experiences provides the basis for the necessity of reporting adverse 
events. In order to improve quality of care and reduce potential errors, one must be able to 
learn from adverse events undertaken. The primary goal of reporting and recording adverse 
events is to learn from them, and the first step in being able to learn from previous 
incidents/mistakes is by recording the events. The World Health Organization’s guidelines for 
adverse event reporting and learning systems (2005) describe the fundamental role of a 
patient safety reporting system as the ability to “enhance patient safety by learning from 
failures of the health care system (p. 3)”. In an influential report out of the United Kingdom, 
titled An organisation with a memory (Department of Health, 2000), UK public health 
researchers highlight the proposed improvement of the National Health Service (NHS) 
through implementation of more effective reporting and information systems, with particular 
emphasis on better documentation of adverse events. Though recording adverse events is an 
important first step in reducing future errors, the act of collecting these events in itself has 
little to no influence on patient safety. It is only through the analysis of these recorded events 
that one can begin to address the causes and therein gains the potential to improve patient 
safety. The mere reporting of adverse events is thus of little value without an analysis (WHO, 
2005).  
 
2.4 Models of adverse events 
 
Person approach 
The tradition of the person approach to error focuses on error seen from the individual 
perspective. It views errors as stemming from an individual’s wayward mental processes such 
as forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence, recklessness etc. 
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(Reason 2000, Vincent 2010). Since the individual is in control of their mental processes, and 
it is these processes that lead to the error, the individual is held completely at fault for the 
error committed.  Methods to reduce error are targeted at individuals and often appeal to 
person’s sense of fear, such as shame, the fear of blame, and the threat of disciplinary action. 
This approach isolates errors from their system context, causing important 
features of human error to be overlooked. Error tends to follow patterns, and 
as such similar circumstances and contexts often lead to the same errors regardless of the 
people involved. Focusing on the individuals that cause errors and ignoring the circumstances 
and situation surrounding the error can impede the pursuit of greater safety (Reason 2000, 
Vincent 2010).  
 
System approach 
While the person approach focuses on individuals’ actions being the cause of error, the 
system approach focuses on fallibility as a part of the human condition. Errors can be seen as 
consequences of underlying problems in the working environment. Methods to reduce error 
focus on the idea of context in which errors occur and employing system defenses of barriers 
and safeguards. When an error occurs, the focus is not on blaming the individual that 
triggered the error, but on which defenses failed and why in the hopes of creating more 
efficient barriers that will successfully prevent such errors in the future (Reason 2000, 
Vincent 2010). 
 
Reason’s Swiss cheese model 
Reason (2000) applies an organizational accident model to the medical context in order to 
better illustrate how human errors can explain adverse events. In the system approach, 
barriers and safeguards are put in to place as defensive layers to prevent error. Ideally these 
defensive layers would be fail proof, but in reality they are filled with holes (resembling a 
slice of Swiss cheese). The “holes” in any one barrier do not necessarily lead to errors, as the 
next barrier usually blocks or prevents the error from happening. However, when the holes in 
all of the barriers momentarily line up it can result error.   
These holes in the barriers and defenses can occur be attributed to two different causes: active 
failures, and latent conditions. Active failures constitute failures in which the negative 
outcomes occur almost immediately. In contrast, latent conditions can take significantly 
longer periods of time, even years, before the consequences of human actions or decisions are 
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fully disclosed. In the context of health care, active failures are generally committed by those 
in direct contract with the patient, while latent conditions are connected to organizational and 
managerial issues. There is emphasis on the fact that safety errors can occur at all levels of the 
system, and that errors arising from human factors are often a result of a chain of causes 
(Reason, 2000).  
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LOSSE
HAZARDS 
Depiction of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blunt end/Sharp end model 
Cook and Woods (1994) offer an additional model to explain accident causation/error. In this 
model, the sharp end refers to health care workers who provide direct patient care, while the 
blunt end refers to those in positions of management and administration. It focuses on how 
interactions between the sharp-end and blunt-end can lead to or prevent errors and accidents. 
The sharp-end is affected by decisions, policies, and regulations, which are made at the blunt-
end. The blunt-end dictates both the resources and constraints that shape the working 
environment for the sharp-end,  and can contribute to errors and accidents by producing latent 
conditions that can increase the probability of sharp-end failure. Further it describes how 
overlapping cognitive factors affect human performance at the sharp end. These factors are:  
• Knowledge factors- factors related to the knowledge that can be drawn on when 
solving problems in context.  
• Attentional dynamics- factors that govern the control of attention and the 
management of mental workload as situations evolve and change over time. 
• Strategic factors- the trade-offs between goals that conflict, especially when the 
practitioners must act under uncertainty, risk, and the pressure of limited resources 
(e.g., time pressure; opportunity costs).  (p. 258) 
The demands of the problem at hand shape the cognitive activities of those confronting the 
incident at the sharp end, and interact with each other to determine if they are flexible enough 
in their thinking to activate relevant knowledge (Cook and Woods, 1994; Morath and 
Turnbull, 2005). 
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2.5 Use of a taxonomy to classify errors 
 
Classifying errors is pivotal to any process of change. A taxonomy is a system of 
classification into ordered categories. Use of a taxonomy in the field of patient safety to 
classify accidents offers the benefit of allowing one to learn from previous experiences; 
information gathered from previous experiences can then be used to improve safety in future 
situations. Through use of a taxonomic structure and conceptual framework, it becomes 
possible to systematically code and index adverse events in such a fashion as to enable the 
recognition of patterns and relationships between events (Wallace and Ross 2006). This also 
allows researchers to access adverse events for further analysis, based on a set of similarities. 
The use of a taxonomy to classify incidents and accidents within coordination of care events 
can serve the overall goal of improving safety by supporting learning from experience. WHO 
(2005)  identifies three key factors should be considered in the design of a classification 
system: 
• The purpose of the reporting system. What is the expected product? How will the 
classification scheme facilitate analysis that will produce the desired outcome? 
• The types of data that are available. Are reporters expected to have carried out an 
investigation and analysis of the event? If not, it is unlikely that they will be able 
to provide useful information concerning underlying systems causes, and events 
will not be able to be classified at that level. 
• Resources. The more detailed and elaborate the classification system is, the more 
expertise will be required, and the costlier the system will be to maintain. 
Taxonomies used within patient safety 
World Health Organizations Conceptual Framework for the International Classification of 
Patient Safety (ICPS) 
 
WHO (2009) has developed a conceptual framework for the international classification of 
patient safety. The conceptual framework aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
the domain of patient safety, and to represent a continuous learning and improvement cycle 
emphasizing identification of risk, prevention, detection, reduction of risk, incident recovery 
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and system resilience. The classification identifies 10 high level classes: incident type, patient 
outcomes, patient characteristics, incident characteristics, contributing factors/hazards, 
organizational outcomes, detection, mitigating factors, ameliorating actions, actions taken to 
reduce risk. Each class has hierarchically arranged subdivisions, and each subdivision is 
further divided into subcategories allowing for classification. 
This classification framework is designed for general use within patient safety, the categories 
regarding incident type, patient outcome, and contributing factors/hazards could offer useful 
information within the analysis of events relating to coordination of care. 
 
ICPS: Tables 1-3 
 
Table 1: ICPS Incident Types 
1. Clinical process/ procedure 2. Clinical administration 
3. Documentation 4. Healthcare associated infection 
5. Medication/ IV fluid 6. Blood/ blood products 
7. Nutrition 8. Oxygen/ gas/ vapor 
9. Medical device/ equipment 10. Behavior 
11. Patient accidents 12. Infrastructure/ buildings/ fixtures 
13. Resources/ organizational management 
 
Table 2: ICPS Patient Outcomes 
1. Type of harm 
2. Degree of harm 
3. Social and/or economic impact 
 
Table 3: ICPS Contributing Factors/ Hazards 
1. Staff factors 2. Patient factors 
3. Work/ environment factors 4. Organizational/ service factors 
5. External Factors 6. Other 
 
 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) Patient Safety 
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Event Taxonomy (PSET) 
The aim of the JCAHO (Chang, et al. 2005) patient safety event taxonomy was to develop a 
common terminology and classification schema (taxonomy) for collecting and organizing 
patient safety data. Through the development of the taxonomy they sought to, “identify 
similarities and gaps in the terminology and classification to create a multidimensional 
taxonomy that encompasses diverse health care settings and incident reporting 
systems”(Chang, et al. 2005, p. 2). 
 
The taxonomy identifies 5 primary classifications: 
• Impact- the outcome or effects of medical error and systems failure commonly 
referred to as harm to the patient.  
• Type- the implied or visible processes that were faulty or failed.  
• Domain- the characteristics of the setting in which an incident occurred and the 
type of individuals involved. 
• Cause- the factors and agents that led to an incident.  
• Prevention and mitigation- the measures taken or proposed to reduce incidence 
and effects of adverse occurrences.!
Each of the primary classifications are further sorted into 21 sub-classifications (see table 2), 
which were in turn subdivided into more than 200 coded categories and an indefinite number 
of non-coded text fields to capture narrative information about specific incidents. 
 
PSET: Tables 4-8 
 
Table 4: PSET Impacts 
Medical Psychological 
Physical Non-medical 
Legal Social 
Economic 
 
Table 5: PSET Types 
Communication 
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Patient management 
Clinical performance 
 
Table 6: PSET Domains 
Setting Staff 
Patient Target 
 
Table 7: PSET Causes 
Systems (structure and process) Organizational 
Technical Human 
 
Table 8: PSET Preventions 
Universal 
Selected 
Indicated 
 
Siemsen’s Taxonomy of Adverse Handover Events (TAHE) 
Siemsen (2011) developed a taxonomy of adverse handover events to capture types of 
handover failures and their underlying factors. The taxonomy was used to categorize and 
analyze adverse handover events within a hospital setting in Denmark. The taxonomy 
distinguishes among both the types of handover failures that occur and the main causal factors 
behind these failures (see table 3)  
 
TAHE: Tables 9-10 
 
Table 9: TAHE Types of Handover Failures 
Failures of clinical communication 
Failures of communication related to tests (laboratory results, x-ray etc.) 
Refusal of responsibility, diffuse allocation or acknowledgement of responsibility 
Responsibility accepted but actual response delayed 
Handover attempted, receiver unavailable 
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Table 10: TAHE Causal Factors 
Deviation from procedure or guideline (both 
individual and organizational) 
Inadequate professional competence or 
knowledge of tasks (both individual and 
organizational) 
Omission – memory lapse or action slip Inadequate procedures or guideline 
Problems with physical or functional 
infrastructure 
Busy ward or interruptions 
Crowded ward 
 
Comparison of the taxonomies 
Types of failure or error was addressed in all three of the taxonomies (see table 4). 
Furthermore all of the taxonomies identified communication failures as one of the major types 
of errors. However, both the WHO (2009) classification and the JCAHO (Chang et al. 2005) 
are designed as general patient safety taxonomies, and as such are designed to identify many 
types of failures, while Siemsen’s taxonomy focuses specifically on errors that occur during 
handover events. 
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Comparison of Type: Table 11 
 
WHO ICPS Types JCAHO PSET 
Types 
Siemsen TAHE Types 
Clinical administration 
 
Communication Failures of clinical communication 
Clinical 
process/procedure 
Patient 
management 
Failures of communication related to 
tests (laboratory results, x-ray etc.) 
Documentation Clinical 
performance 
Refusal of responsibility, diffuse 
allocation or acknowledgement of 
responsibility 
Healthcare associated 
infection 
 Responsibility accepted but actual 
response delayed 
Medication/IV fluid  Handover attempted, receiver 
unavailable 
Blood/blood products   
Nutrition   
Oxygen/gas/vapor   
Medical 
device/equipment 
  
Behavior   
Patient accidents   
Infrastructure/building/
fixtures 
  
Resources/organization
al management 
  
 
 
Causal factors were also addressed in all three of the taxonomies (see table 5). All three of the 
taxonomies addressed both individual and organizational/system factors. Siemsen’s (2011) 
taxonomy focuses solely on causal factors of handover errors, while the other two taxonomies 
address a wider range of factors. 
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Comparison of Causal Factors: Table 12 
               
WHO ICPS JCAHO PSET Siemsen TAHE 
Staff factors Systems 
(structure and 
process) 
Deviation from procedure or guideline 
(both individual and organizational) 
Patient factors Technical Inadequate professional competence or 
knowledge of tasks (both individual and 
organizational) 
Work/environment 
factors 
Organizational Omission – memory lapse or action slip 
Organizational/service 
factors 
Human Inadequate procedures or guideline 
External factors  Problems with physical or functional 
infrastructure 
Other  Busy ward or interruptions 
  Crowded ward 
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3 Context 
 
In this chapter I will define the context in which the study takes place by giving an 
explanation of relevant laws and judicial considerations, a brief overview of the Norwegian 
healthcare system, an overview of the coordination reform, an explanation of the adverse 
event reporting system used, and case descriptions of the case in the study. 
 
3.1 Relevant laws and judicial considerations 
 
Obligation to report/notify 
Under Norwegian law (Lov om helsepersonell § 38, and Lov om spesialisthelsetjenesten § 3-
3), all health personnel are obligated to report any events in which a patient sustains 
significant personal injury from the health care they are provided, or situations in which one 
patient causes injury to another. In addition, events that could have potentially lead to 
personal injury also fall under the obligation to report. The goal of the reporting of these 
events is to improve patient safety, and the reports are to be used to clarify the causes of the 
event and to prevent similar events from taking place in the future (lovdata.no). 
Obligation to facilitate coordination 
Norwegian law (Lov om kommunale helse- og omsorgstjenester § 3-4, and Lov om 
spesialisthelsetjenesten § 2-1e) also states that under both specialized health care providers 
and primary health care providers are obligated to facilitate coordination of care, both within 
levels of care and between levels of care, such that all health and care services provided in the 
country can best function as a single unit (lovdata.no). 
 
Additionally, it is stated that all health care personnel providing care under these acts shall 
ensure that the organization is working systematically to improve quality and patient safety 
(Lov om spesialisthelsetjenesten § 3-4a, and Lov om kommunale helse- og omsorgstjenester § 
4-2, available from lovdata.no). 
 
3.2 Norwegian Healthcare System 
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The Norwegian healthcare system is based on universal coverage, and built on the principle 
that all residents should have equal access to necessary health care and services regardless of 
social status, income, and geography. Health care services in Norway are divided into primary 
and specialized services. Primary health care services are run by the municipalities. Primary 
health care services that each municipality is responsible for include: general medical services 
including a general practitioner scheme, preventative care such as checkups and 
immunizations, emergency first aid, physiotherapy, nursing homes, and home health nursing 
services. 
 
Secondary or specialized health care services are owned and run by the state. There are four 
regional health authorities and 30 local hospital trusts (owned by regional health authorities). 
The four regional health authorities are responsible for ensuring that specialized health care 
services (such as outpatient specialist care and hospitals) are provided within their region, and 
the trusts are responsible for delivering these services (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 
2007, 2009). 
 
3.3 Coordination reform 
 
In 2009, Norway launched a coordination reform with a focus on delivering the proper 
treatment at the right place and right time. This reform was implemented January 1, 2012. The 
goal of the coordination reform was an increased focus on prevention, earlier treatment, and 
better coordination between services (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2009). The 
coordination reform addressed three major challenges, and then recommended five primary 
steps to face them. The three main challenges identified are: 
• Patients’ needs for coordinated services are not being sufficiently met. 
• Too little initiative aimed at limiting and preventing disease.  
• Population development and the changing range of illnesses among the population. 
The recommended five key steps for dealing with the three major challenges are: 
• A clearer role for the patient.  
• A new municipal role emphasizing prevention, early intervention efforts, low- 
 threshold initiatives and interdisciplinary measures.  
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• Changing the funding system so that municipal co-funding of the specialist health 
 care services is a vital element.  
• Developing the specialist health care services to enable them to apply their 
 specialized competence to a greater extent.  
• Facilitating better-defined priorities.  
The main changes of the coordination reform resulted in a shift in the responsibility of health 
care providers, giving the primary health care providers a larger role and putting more 
emphasis on preventative care. This way patients could receive the majority of their care from 
primary health care providers, and hospital discharge could take place earlier. The reform 
dictates that agreements between primary and secondary health care providers should be 
drawn up in order to formalize how responsibilities were to be divided and how the two care 
providers were to improve their cooperative patterns in order to ensure more coordinated 
health care services patients (Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2009). 
3.4 Synergi 
 
Synergi is an electronic reporting system used by the healthcare trust and municipal primary 
care providers to report adverse events. The goal of using this reporting system is to: 
• Prevent unwanted/adverse events 
• Correct problems 
• Learn from previous experiences/mistakes 
Once an adverse event or near miss occurs, the healthcare worker witnessed or experienced 
the event is responsible for recording the event in the Synergi system. Both healthcare 
workers working in a specialized health care or hospital setting and those working in the 
primary care setting can use Synergi to report adverse events. The person reporting the 
adverse event fills out details such as date and time of the event, and then writes a description 
of what happened and any immediate actions that were taken to prevent or limit injury or 
damage. The report is then sent on to the manager in charge of the unit where the event 
occurred. The manager is then responsible for handling the adverse event report by trying to 
find the cause of the error and suggesting measures to be put in place to prevent such events 
from taking place again in the future. 
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3.5 Case description 
 
The chosen case consists of a healthcare trust in more rural setting and the primary health care 
providers within the region that cooperate with the healthcare trust. The healthcare trust has 
approximately 2200 employees and consists of one central hospital and three regional 
hospitals in addition to two district psychiatric centers. The trust is also provides ambulance 
service and has ambulance stations throughout the region. There are 26 municipalities within 
the region responsible for providing primary health care services. There are approximately 
108,210 people living in the region. The region covers an area of approximately 18,623 km2.  
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4 Methods 
In this chapter I will describe the methods used in this study. I will address the research 
design that was chosen, the sample included in the study, data collection, analysis, and ethical 
considerations. 
4.1 Design 
An exploratory case study approach has been chosen as research design using a mixed 
methods approach (key informant interviews and document analysis). Exploratory design can 
be used when there is lack of previous knowledge about the area being studied (Jacobsen, 
2005). There is little knowledge about the types of adverse events that are reported in relation 
to coordination of care between primary and specialized health care services (Laugaland, 
Aase and Barach 2011), therefor an exploratory design has been chosen.  Yin (2009) states 
that, “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and with in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context is not clearly evident” (p. 18). The boundaries between adverse events and the 
contexts in which they occur are not always clearly evident, and as such a case study design 
was utilized. 
The case in this study consisted of a rural setting with a healthcare trust comprised of four 
relatively small hospitals and the 26 municipalities responsible for providing primary care 
services within the region.  
 
The aim of the case study design was to: 
• To explore the types, frequency, causes, and consequences of adverse events seen in 
relation to coordination of care between primary and secondary health care services. 
 
4.2 Sample 
The study was composed of two major data sources: 
Source 1- key interviews with Synergi coordinator 
Source 2- adverse event reports 
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4.3 Interviews with Synergi coordinator 
In order to analyze the collected adverse event reports, more details and information about the 
reporting system used were necessary. To gain this information, key interviews were 
conducted. The coordinator responsible for the Synergi reporting system were the natural 
choice in order to gain more insight into the operation of the reporting system as they work 
with the system on a daily basis and have a good working knowledge of how it functions. The 
Synergi coordinator was sent an invitation to be a part of the study along with an 
informational letter explaining the study (Attachment 1). The coordinators responded 
positively to participating.  In addition to providing interviews, the coordinators also provided 
access to the adverse event reports. 
 
4.3.1 Adverse event reports 
The prime focus of the study was the analysis of adverse events related to coordination of 
care, and therefore only adverse event reports directly related to coordination of care were of 
interest. When events are initially reported (this can be done by healthcare personal working 
in the hospital or in primary care services), it is possible for the type of event to be 
categorized as coordination with municipal primary health care services. If the initial reporter 
overlooks this category, it is also possible for the manager in charge of dealing with the case 
to add this afterwards. In Case A, the total number of reported adverse events is manageable 
so that the Synergi coordinator is able to read through all reported events and flag the event as 
relating to coordination with municipal primary care services in the event that both the initial 
reporter and the manager handling the adverse event report have not included this detail. In 
order to narrow the results of the adverse event reports, only the events that were flagged in 
the system as relating to coordination of care were included in this study.  
 
While patients’ age was an inclusion criteria in the QSEHCS study, the anonymous nature of 
the event reports made it difficult to include or exclude reports based on age. In some of the 
reports it was possible to determine the certain details about the patient involved in the 
incident (for example, some reports mentioned that the patient was elderly, or that the patient 
suffered from dementia). Since only a fraction of the reports included details that allowed the 
reports to be narrowed by factors such as age or type of illness, such inclusion/exclusion 
criteria were not included in the study. 
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All of the reports that were marked as relating to coordination of care were then read through 
to guarantee that the content was related to the type of coordination being examined in the 
study (i.e. coordination between primary and specialized health care providers). After reading 
through the event description in each of the reports, all reports with descriptions accurately 
depicting events that related to coordination of care between primary and specialized health 
care services were included. Reports that described events that did not have a direct 
connection coordination of care were excluded. Reports that lacked a significant description 
of the event were also not included in the analysis.  
 
In order to get a clear perspective of whether or not the coordination reform has had an effect 
on the types, frequency, causes, and consequences of reported adverse events seen in relation 
to coordination of care, it was important to have an adequate amount of reports both from 
before the reform was put into place (January 1, 2012) and after. There was a total of 144 
reports before the coordination reform and 122 reports after it was put into place. There was 
no date constraint used to limit the number of reports, and all reports that filled the inclusion 
criteria were used.  
 
4.4 Data collection 
4.4.1 Key interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the Synergi coordinator in order to gain a 
better understanding of how the reporting system worked. An interview guide was used in 
order to make sure that key points were covered and the interviews were recorded (after 
approval was gained from each of the informants) in order to guarantee that no data is 
misunderstood or overlooked (Appendix 2). The main themes covered in the interviews 
included how adverse events are reported (both in the hospital and primary care setting), how 
they are handled after they are reported, problems that arise during the reporting process, and 
how the reporting system is designed.  The informant chose the location for the interview, the 
interview took place in the office of the coordinators. The coordinator was not provided with 
the interview guide prior to the interview. The interview in lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
The informant covered most of the topics outlined in the interview guide without being 
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prompted. Follow up questions and examples were asked for in cases where the explanation 
was unclear.  
 
In addition to the semi-structured interview, 4 days were spent with the Synergi coordinator 
during the collection of the adverse event reports. Additional questions were asked and 
conversations took place during this time that both answered practical questions and gave a 
better understanding of how the reporting system worked. Key words and phrases were noted 
during these conversations, and summary notes were written each evening to make sure that 
important information was documented during the data collection process.  
 
4.4.2 Adverse event reports 
The Synergi coordinator helped facilitate gaining access to the adverse event reports. I am an 
employee at one of the hospitals in a different health trust and already had basic user access to 
the reporting program (that allowed me to report events, but that did not allow me to read 
already reported events). I was granted extended user access during the data collection period 
so that I was able to search for and access the event reports myself, rather than requiring one 
of the coordinators to do this work for me as it was a time consuming process. The adverse 
event reports used in the study do not include sensitive information (such as name or date of 
birth) about the patients involved that could be used to identify them, which allowed me to 
search for the event reports without having to compromising the patients right to 
confidentiality. I used a computer that was available at the Synergi coordinator’s office to 
access the reports. 
 
In order to find event reports that were related to coordination of care, I conducted searches 
within the Synergi system. There was a limited amount of how many reports each search 
could pull up, so searches were done on a year by year basis starting from 2007 when the 
reporting system was first adopted. In addition to limiting the searches by year, I also limited 
them so that only events reported within the appropriate health care trust would come up 
(multiple options for responsible health care trust were available). Under the advanced search 
options I chose to search under the field of “where and what”, and further choose to limit the 
search by event type selecting events related to coordination of care with municipalities (one 
of the options in the pull down menu). All of the options during the search process were 
28 
 
chosen from pull down menu options, and no free-text search fields were utilized. The same 
search process was performed for each year from 2007 to 2013.  
 
After the search results were displayed, I read through the event description included in each 
adverse event report to decide if it met the inclusion criteria. All adverse event reports that 
met the inclusions criteria were then entered into an excel sheet. The case number was noted 
to make it easier to go back and recheck the event report in case there was a need to do so at a 
later point in time. The date of the event and a brief summary of what happened (for example, 
patient sent home without discharge paperwork and prescriptions for new medications) were 
also recorded. The events were then analyzed and coded. 
 
4.5 Analysis 
The analysis of the reported adverse events were originally based on Siemsen’s Taxonomy of 
Adverse Handover Events (2011). The taxonomy was developed in order to capture types of 
handover failures and their underlying factors in a hospital setting. The taxonomy 
distinguishes among five non-overlapping types of handover failures (failures of clinical 
communication, failures of communication related to tests, unclear or rejected responsibility, 
delayed response, and receiver unavailable), and seven main causal factors (inadequate 
competence, infrastructure problems, busy ward and interruptions, inadequate procedures, 
deviations from procedures, crowding, omissions and lapses). The taxonomy was developed 
to capture errors during handovers from unit to unit within a hospital, rather than errors that 
occur when a patient is transferred between hospital and primary health care services. Though 
it was not specifically designed to be used in handover situations between primary and 
specialized health care services, it is the only taxonomy that has been developed with the 
specific intention of capturing handover errors. Both the World Health Organizations 
Conceptual Framework for the International Classification of Patient Safety (2009) and the 
Join Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations Patient Safety Event 
Taxonomy are more general and do not specifically cater to adverse events relating to 
handovers or coordination. Because of this, Siemsen’s Taxonomy of Adverse Handover 
Events (2011) was initially used to analyze the event reports in this study. 
 
The first step in the analysis process was to read each of the event descriptions two or three 
times to make sure that I had a clear understanding of what occurred. Next, the type of failure 
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was categorized out from the types of handover failures presented in Siemsen’s Taxonomy of 
Adverse Handover Events (2011). If there were multiple failures described in the event, each 
one was included rather than choosing a primary failure. The failure/failures were then 
recorded in the excel sheet under type of failure. Next the event description was examined 
with regard to the causal factors presented in the taxonomy. Again, if multiple causal factors 
were identified, all of them were included and then recorded. Even descriptions that were hard 
to code were flagged and set aside to be re-read after the first round of coding was finished. 
This allowed more time to think about each event and the ability to group difficult cases that 
were similar so that all of the event reports were coded consistently. There was an openness 
for new codes, and events were not forced to fit the taxonomy. However, after re-reading 
many of the event reports there were quite a few that did not fit the taxonomy. This indicated 
the need for modifications to be made to the existing taxonomy. The causal factors section of 
Siemsen’s Taxonomy of Adverse Handover Events (2011) fit with all the adverse event 
reports, however the types of errors in Siemsen’s Taxonomy did fit with many of the adverse 
events. Through a process of re-reading all the handover events and identify common themes 
within types of errors, an new model for analyzing the types of errors was created. This model 
identified 4 main types of adverse events: failures in written communication/documentation, 
failures in spoken communication, diffuse/unclear responsibility, and not performing 
expected duties. Adverse events relating to written communication/documentation and spoken 
communication were further broken down into three categories: miss communication, delayed 
communication, and inaccurate/incorrect communication. All adverse event reports were able 
to be coded using this model. 
 
4.6 Ethical considerations 
The study has been approved by the Regional Committees for Medical and Health Research 
Ethics (REC, ref. num. 2011/1978) as a part of the larger QSEHCS study. The interviews 
conducted during the study were based on informed written consent (Appendix 3), and 
informants were able withdraw from the study at any point in time with no negative 
consequences.  
 
The adverse event reports used in the study do not include sensitive information (such as 
name or date of birth of patients) about the patients involved that could be used to identify 
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them. Therefor having access to these reports never put patients at risk for violation of their 
right to privacy.  
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5 Results 
This chapter presents results found in the analysis of adverse event reports.  Results will be 
discussed by first presenting at what point adverse events occurred during handover process, 
the types of adverse events that occurred, the causal factors behind them, the consequences of 
these events, and noticeable differences between before and after the coordination form was 
implemented.  
 
When adverse events occur 
Adverse events were reported relating to both hospital admissions and discharges. 
 
5.1.1 Admission 
Adverse events reported relating to hospital admission were less common than those reported 
in connection with the discharge process. The main types of adverse events reported in 
connection with hospital admission were: missing or inaccurate referrals, missing or delayed 
nursing reports from in-home health care providers and nursing homes, and lack of 
notification to in-home health care providers about patients hospital admission. Less 
commonly reported adverse events that occurred in connection with the admission process 
included disagreements between referring doctor and specialist on whether or not the patient 
should be admitted, and electronic referrals that were never received. 
 
5.1.2 Discharge 
The majority of adverse events reported occurred in connection with the discharge process. 
The main types of errors reported in connection with discharge were: lack of information 
given regarding time of discharge, lack of information or incorrect information regarding 
patient’s condition, delayed and/or incorrect discharge reports, missing prescriptions for new 
medications, and necessary medications not sent with the patient upon discharge, and patients 
discharged with unclear follow up. Less commonly reported adverse events occurring during 
the discharge process included: patients discharged with incorrect medications, medical 
equipment not removed at time of discharge (for example: iv port, stitches, urinary catheters), 
and discharge information sent to the wrong person and/or wrong location. 
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5.2 Types of adverse events 
There were multiple types of adverse events identified in the adverse event reports. 
5.2.1 Written communication/documentation 
Adverse events relating written communication/documentation errors were the most common 
among the adverse events reported. Types of documents included referrals, nursing care 
reports, medication lists, discharge reports, and prescriptions for new medications.  
 
Missing 
Missing written communication/documentation was one of the most common types of adverse 
events relating to communication/documentation reported. Missing documents included 
referrals, nursing care reports and medication lists during hospital admissions; and 
prescriptions for new medications and discharge reports during the discharge process.  
 
One of the most common adverse events reported in connection with hospital admission was 
missing referrals. Referrals provide important information about the patient’s condition and 
health concerns in addition to the reason(s) the patient is in need of specialized health care 
treatment. In one adverse event report, the referring doctor had not physically examined the 
patient, and therefore felt that he did not have the necessary information to write an adequate 
referral. In another case, a referral was written by the referring doctor and sent electronically, 
but was never received by the intended specialist. This resulted in a delay in delivery of care 
to the affected patient. There were also multiple cases were patients were sent directly to the 
radiology department by the referring doctor but did not have referrals with them. This also 
led to delayed care as the radiology department could not carry out their job without a 
referral. Additionally patients and their next of kin often became frustrated as they felt they 
were receiving conflicting messages from the referring doctor and those working in the 
radiology department. 
 
Missing nursing care reports were also a problem during the admission process. There were 
multiples event reports in which patients suffering from dementia were sent to the hospital 
without an accompanying nursing care report explain their daily care needs and they were not 
able to make these needs known themselves.  
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Missing medication lists also posed a problem during hospital admission. There were multiple 
reported adverse events where they primary care provider was not able to be reached in order 
to obtain an up-to-date medication list. The admitting doctor is then forced to rely on the 
patients on knowledge of their current medications and medication lists from previous 
hospital stays. All of the reported events regarding missing medication lists during admission 
resulted in the patients not receiving the proper medication. In the majority of the reported 
events the medication errors were detected and rectified during the patients hospitalizations; 
however, in two cases the medication errors were not discovered until after the patients were 
discharged. 
 
The most common item missing during the discharge process were prescriptions for new 
medications or medications with new doses. This most often resulted in the patient not 
receiving necessary medication in the right doses, and caused municipal health care workers 
to use extra time and resources in order to resolve the problem. In one case cancer patient was 
sent home without prescriptions for newly started pain medications. Additionally, the nearest 
pharmacy did not stock these medications and had to wait until they received the prescriptions 
before the medications could be ordered. As a result, the patient suffered multiple days 
without the necessary pain medication.  
 
While discharge reports were most often delayed, there were a couple of situations in which 
the discharge report was missing altogether. In one case the missing discharge report resulted 
in a patient taking a medication that was no longer prescribed for three months. The patient’s 
primary care provider never received the discharge report and the error was not discovered 
until the patient was rehospitalized three months later. 
 
Delayed 
Though less common then missing and inaccurate/incorrect documentation, delayed written 
communication/documentation also posed a threat to patient safety. Delayed documents 
included nursing care reports and medication lists during hospital admission, and discharge 
reports during the discharge process. 
 
The majority of reported events relating to problems with nursing care reports during hospital 
admission were the result of missing care reports; however, there were a few cases in which 
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the nursing care reports were not missing, but delayed. However, this made little difference 
for patient outcomes. In one adverse event report the patients next of kin had provided 
necessary care information after receiving a phone call from a confused nurse working in the 
admitting unit. In another adverse event report the nursing care report was received two days 
after the patient was admitted. At this point a new care plan had already been written for the 
patient and the delayed care plan was never fully read. 
 
The most commonly delayed form of written communication/documentation was the 
discharge report. They were many adverse event reports in which the patient was discharged 
before the discharge report was finished. The delays in the discharge report being sent varied 
between hours and months. In one adverse event report, a primary care doctor received a 
discharge report for a patient who had died nearly a year earlier. Most often the delay in 
receiving the discharge report resulted in delays in care and delays in receiving necessary 
medication. In one case a patient received the wrong medication dose for six days until the 
delayed discharge report was received. In another case the delayed discharge report resulted 
in a four week delay in starting with important anti-thrombosis treatment.  Another patient did 
not receive necessary wound dressing changes for multiple days due to a delay in home health 
care providers receiving the discharge report. 
 
Inaccurate/incorrect 
Inaccurate/incorrect written communication/documentation was also a commonly reported 
adverse event. Documents that were inaccurate/incorrect included medication lists during 
hospital admissions, and discharge reports during the discharge process. One adverse event 
report included a prescription for new medication that was incorrect. 
 
There were multiple adverse event reports that included incorrect medication lists during 
hospital admission. In one adverse event report, the referral included an out dated medication 
list which did not include important blood thinning medication that the patient had recently 
started taking. The patient did not receive this medication during the entire two week hospital 
stay, and the error was not discovered until after the patient was discharged. 
 
There were also quite a large number of adverse event reports that included 
inaccurate/incorrect discharge reports. Most often it was medication updates in the discharge 
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report that were incorrect. In one reported adverse event, a patient’s insulin dosage was 
supposed to be reduced from 8 I.U. to 6 I.U. The doctor writing the discharge report 
accidently wrote 60 I.U. of insulin on the discharge report instead of 6 I.U. Luckily the home 
health care nurse responsible for administering the patients insulin shots new the patient quite 
well and recognized the large increase in dosage as a possible mistake and double checked 
with hospital personal before giving the insulin shot.  
 
One adverse event report included a prescription for a new medication that was written 
incorrectly. The prescription was written on a normal A4 size blank piece of paper and did not 
include that doctor’s stamp. As a result, the pharmacy did not fill the prescription as the 
prescription did not appear to be legitimate. It was a Friday evening and the pharmacy was 
closed for the weekend, so the patient was not able to receive the prescribed medication until 
the following Monday. 
 
5.2.2 Spoken communication 
Adverse events relating to missing, delayed, and/or inaccurate/contradictive spoken 
communication were the second most commonly reported type of adverse event.  
 
Missing 
Missing spoken communication was the most common type of adverse event related to 
spoken communication. Missing spoken communication included lack of notification from 
referring doctor about patients being sent by ambulance to the hospital, and lack of report and 
information about the time of discharge. 
 
There were multiple adverse event reports in which there was no spoken communication 
between the referring doctor and the admitting doctor. In some cases the admitting doctor 
received notice from ambulance personnel that they were on their way with a new patient. In 
other cases, the admitting doctor did receive any information about the referred patient until 
the ambulance arrived at the hospital. Not having adequate notification of the incoming 
patient gave one admitting doctor some problems as there were no available beds when the 
patient arrived.  In the majority of these cases it was unclear whether or not an adequate 
referral was sent along with the patient in the ambulance. 
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Lack of report and information about the time of discharge was a commonly reported adverse 
event. There were many adverse event reports in which patients were discharged to home 
health care or nursing home facilities without any notification. In a few cases, notification was 
given about the discharge, but no report was given on the patients condition. An example of 
this was one adverse event report in which a cancer patient was to be discharged to a home 
health care provider. The home health care provided was informed about the planned time of 
discharge, but did not receive any information about the patients need for pain medication 
administered via a medication pump. The necessary equipment was not in place when the 
patient returned home, and there was a significant delay before the patient received the 
necessary pain medication. In another case information about the patients condition and post 
discharge needs were clearly explained to the nursing home responsible for post discharge 
care; however, the nursing home never received notice when the patient was actually 
supposed to be discharged and were caught off guard when the patient showed up without 
warning. In the majority of cases no information was given what so ever. 
 
Delayed 
Delayed spoken communication was a less commonly reported adverse event, but still posed 
problems. There were a few situations in which spoken communication about the patients 
condition and time of discharge were given to the post discharge care providers, but were 
given on such short notice that the post discharge care providers still did not have adequate 
time to prepare for the incoming patient. 
 
Inaccurate/contradictive 
Inaccurate/contradictive spoken communication was the second most commonly reported 
adverse event. During the admission process, contradicting messages from the referring 
doctor and the admitting doctor caused confusion for ambulance personnel responsible for 
transporting the patient to the hospital. Inaccurate/contradictive information also cause 
problems during the discharge process. 
 
There were multiple adverse event reports that described situations where ambulance 
personnel transporting patients to the hospital received contradictive spoken communication 
from referring doctor and the admitting doctor. For example, in one adverse event report 
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ambulance personnel are initially told to transport the patient to the hospital to be admitted. 
En route to the hospital, the receive contradicting information from the admitting doctor at the 
hospital saying that the patient is not to be admitted, and that the patient should be driven 
back to the referring doctor for further follow up. A while later, the admitting doctor calls the 
ambulance personnel back and says that the patient needs to be admitted after all. The 
contradicting messages from the referring doctor and the admitting doctor lead to delay in 
care, and increased discomfort for the patient. Additionally, the ambulance crew was not 
available for other missions for a longer period of time, as they had to drive back and forth 
unnecessarily. 
 
Adverse events related to inaccurate/contradictive spoken communication were also common 
during the discharge process. There were quite a few adverse event reports in which nurses in 
the hospital made spoken agreements and plans with home health care providers and nursing 
home care providers that were not held. For example, there were multiple adverse event 
reports in which the hospital nurse makes an agreement that the discharge report and 
necessary medications will be sent with the patient upon discharge, only for the patients to 
turn up at the post discharge care facility with neither a discharge report or necessary 
medications. In one adverse event report the patient did not receive necessary medication for 
multiple days as the nursing home the patient was discharged to had no information about the 
patients new medications without the discharge report. In another report the patient was sent 
home without medication even though this was agreed upon, and had to go without 
medication for the first weekend as the pharmacy was closed. 
 
There were also a number of adverse even reports in which plans regarding time and date of 
discharge were agreed upon and then not followed through with. There were reports of 
patients who were discharged earlier than agreed upon without further notification, which in 
one situation resulted in necessary medical equipment not being in place at the patients home 
at time of discharge. There were also a few reports were a patient was discharged later than 
planned without giving adequate notice to the post discharge care providers.  
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5.2.3 Diffuse/unclear responsibility 
Another type of adverse event reported in connection with coordination of care was diffuse 
and/or unclear delineation of responsibility. There were multiple examples of how 
diffuse/unclear responsibility threatened patients’ safety. 
 
In multiple adverse event reports there was no clear delineation of who was expected to 
provide the patient with follow up care after discharge. For example, in one adverse event 
report a patient was discharge with low hemoglobin. The discharging doctor assumed that it 
was the patient’s primary care provider to follow up and treatment, while the primary care 
provider assumed that the discharging doctor had reason for not addressing the problem in the 
first place.  
 
In another adverse event report a patient’s blood pressure medication was removed without 
any follow up care in place. The discharging doctor assumed that the patient’s primary care 
doctor would set up blood pressures checks with the patient, and the patients primary care 
doctor assumed that the blood pressure was no longer a problem. The patient was later 
readmitted to the hospital due to high blood pressure. 
 
5.2.4 Not performing expected duties 
There were also some adverse event reports where the health care personnel responsible did 
not perform expected duties, something that can compromise the patient’s safety. 
 
There were multiple adverse event reports where patients were discharged with medical 
equipment that should have been removed (iv port, stiches, urinary catheters). In one case a 
patient was discharged without removing an iv port that was no longer needed. The problem 
was not discovered until a week after the patient had been discharged, putting the patient at 
increased risk of infection. 
 
In another adverse event report a patient was discharged with test results indicating a urinary 
tract infection, however no antibiotics had been prescribed.  
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There were also multiple adverse event reports where a patient was discharged without 
necessary medication being sent with them. In the majority of cases the patient did not receive 
necessary medications for a 1-3 day period due the nurses at the hospital not carrying out 
required actions. In a two adverse event report, home health care nurses were able to borrow 
necessary medications from a nearby nursing home so that patients could receive necessary 
medication that was neglected to be sent home with them. However, doing so went against the 
guidelines set in place and also required use of extra time and resources. 
 
5.2.5 Multiple errors 
There were often multiple errors in each adverse event report. In some reports one error lead 
to the next error, setting off a chain reaction of error, while in other reports the errors occurred 
independently of each other. 
 
Chain reaction errors 
There were multiple adverse event reports where an initial error set into motion a chain 
reaction of errors. The most common chain reaction error set were patients who were 
admitted with inaccurate/incorrect medication lists. The initial incorrect medication list led to 
the patient’s medication list during their hospital stay also being incorrect. The incorrect 
medication list is then used to in the discharge report. In some adverse event reports this 
problem was identified somewhat quickly after discharge, while in other reports it took 
considerably longer. 
 
Independent errors 
There were multiple adverse event reports in which there were three independent errors 
occurring during the discharge process in one single report. These three errors included lack 
of information about planned time of discharge, delayed discharge report, and 
inaccurate/incorrect discharge report. While these errors are all related, they occurred 
independently of each other. All adverse event reports with this combination of errors resulted 
in the patients not receiving necessary medication and/or care at the appropriate time. 
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5.3 Causal factors 
Multiple different causal factors were identified in the adverse event reports analyzed. While 
some reports showed very clear causal factors, other reports were not as clear. In some cases, 
causal factors could not be definitively identified. The reports with easily identifiable causal 
factors often contained causal factors in each report. Common causal factors included 
deviation from guidelines, inadequate professional knowledge or skills, memory lapses, 
inadequate procedures or guidelines, problems with infrastructure, and busy ward or 
interruptions.  
 
Deviation from guidelines 
Deviations from guidelines were the most common causal factors. Deviations from guidelines 
occurred both during hospital admission and the discharge process. During hospital 
admission, deviations from guidelines cause problems such as missing referrals and missing 
nursing care report. During the discharge process deviations from guidelines led to patients 
being discharged without adequate notice to post discharge care providers, patients being 
discharged with delayed and incorrect discharge reports, and patients being discharged 
without necessary medications. 
 
Inadequate professional competence or knowledge of skills 
Inadequate professional competence or knowledge of skills was also a causal factor of 
adverse events. There were two examples where a discharge report containing errors was 
written by a junior doctor being overseen by an attending doctor. The junior doctor lacked the 
competence or knowledge to recognize the errors in the report. The attending doctor was 
responsible for double checking the junior doctors discharge reports, however this was not 
done (deviation from guidelines) and the errors went unnoticed.  
 
Memory lapse 
Memory lapses were also a common factor. Memory lapses were identified as causal factors 
for missing nursing care report during hospital admission, and patients being discharged 
without adequate notice to post discharge care providers, patients being discharged with 
delayed and incorrect discharge reports, and patients being discharged without necessary 
medications. 
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Inadequate procedure or guidelines 
Inadequate procedure or guidelines were not directly identified as a causal factor in any of the 
adverse event reports.  
 
Problems with infrastructure 
A few adverse event reports identified problems with infrastructure (specifically computer 
related problems) as casual factors. In all the involved reports, infrastructure problems led to 
not being able to access necessary documents (referrals, nursing care reports and discharge 
reports) in a timely fashion. 
 
Busy ward or interruptions 
While many adverse event reports could potentially be interpreted as being due to busy wards 
and interruptions, only a handful clearly identified this as a causal factor. One report stated 
clearly that illness in the hospital unit had led to both delayed discharge reports, and 
inaccurate discharge reports due to the doctor writing the report not having a good knowledge 
of the patient’s condition and progression during hospitalization. Another report 
acknowledged lack of staff due to summer vacation as a cause for memory lapses and 
guidelines not being followed (other causal factors). 
 
5.4 Consequences 
Consequences and patient outcomes were not always easily identifiable in the adverse event 
reports. The most commonly identified consequence was medication errors. The medication 
errors ranged from being relatively minor (a patient receiving a lower dosage of paracetemol 
than prescribed) to having the potential to cause serious injury or death (an insulin dose six 
times higher than actually intended). In the majority of cases the medication errors had no 
lasting effects on the patients, or were caught by health care personnel in time to avoid major 
injury. 
 
There were also quite a few episodes of patient information being treated in such a way that it 
risked the patient’s right to confidentiality. There were multiple discharge reports that were 
faxed to city hall instead of the appropriate post discharge care facility. Additionally there 
were multiple faxes sent with patient’s full name and ID number connected to the patient’s 
sensitive medical information. In one case a discharge report- containing patient’s name, ID 
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number, and all information pertaining to the most recent hospitalization- was sent to the 
patient’s primary care provider without being placed in an envelope.  
 
5.5 Differences from before and after coordination reform 
One notable difference from before and after the coordination reform was put into place was 
the most common type of error. Before the coordination reform was put into place the most 
common type or error was inaccurate/incorrect discharge papers, while after the reform, lack 
of information about time of discharge to post discharge caregivers was the most common 
type of error. Additionally errors short notice of patient discharge (less than 24 hours) were 
only reported after the coordination form went into place. 
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6 Discussion 
6.1 Admissions vs. discharge 
The majority of research available within the field of patient safety is focused on 
handovers relating to hospital discharge rather than hospital admission. Interestingly, 
the majority of the adverse event reports reviewed in this paper also were also events 
occurring during the discharge process. A potential conclusion could be drawn that 
there are more adverse events occurring during hospital discharge than during hospital 
admission. A finding that could also explain the reason for the increased amount of 
research focusing on handovers relating to the discharge process rather than the 
handover event of hospital admission. However, there are many other possible 
explanations for this correlation and for the reason that there are more discharge 
events reported than admission events. 
 
 One possible explanation could be potential differences in reporting cultures between 
primary and specialized health care fields. The majority of discharge related events 
are reported by primary health care workers, while the majority of admission related 
events are reported by specialized health care workers. If, for example, primary health 
care field in general had a culture more oriented towards reporting, this could account 
for the difference in number of reported events during the admission and discharge 
process. More research into possible differences in reporting culture between primary 
and specialized health care fields would be necessary in order to determine if this 
could be a valid explanation.  
 
Additionally, there are many studies showing that under reporting of adverse events is 
a common problem. Due to this, the fact that there are more reported adverse events 
during the discharge process rather than the admission process does not necessarily 
mean that there are more actual adverse events occurring during the discharge process 
than during hospital admission. 
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6.2 Availability of discharge reports 
It was found Walraven, et al. (2002) study on the effects of discharge report 
availability on hospital readmission that only a small amount of follow up doctors had 
received the discharge reports by the time of the follow up visit. Additionally, 
hospitalizations were more likely in situations where the follow up doctor did not 
have the discharge report available. Missing or delayed discharge reports also proved 
to be one of the more common types of adverse events identified in this study. 
Walraven, et al.’s research on the importance of availability of discharge reports was 
published over 10 years ago, so the problem of missing or delayed discharge reports is 
hardly new. Before the coordination form was launched, delayed discharge reports 
were the most common type of adverse event reported relating to coordination of 
care. However, while delayed reports were still a problem they were no longer the 
most common type of reported adverse event after the coordination reform was put in 
place. This could possible indicate the coordination reform successfully reducing the 
number of delayed discharge reports. However, more research is needed in order to 
support or disprove this theory. 
 
6.3 Written vs. spoken communication 
While results may seem to indicate the increased presence of errors based in written 
communication, versus spoken communication, this would require additional 
exploration to determine its validity. There is substantial evidence to indicate that the 
majority of communication in a healthcare setting (connected to medical indications, 
discharges and care instructions) is carried out in writing, versus in speech (direct 
contact, and telephonic contact occurs seldom). As such, the primary method of 
communication is written, which is also identified as more traceable for caregivers 
who are handling multiple patients, with a high level of distraction. Other research has 
previously indicated that early telephone contact could be an intervention that could 
stop adverse event in patient transfers (Foster, et al. 2004). In addition to telephone 
contact being important, it is also important to acknowledge that while written 
communication errors seem to be more frequent, this does not necessarily identify 
them as more vulnerable, simply as a significantly more prevalent form of 
communication. 
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6.4 Person approach vs. system approach 
The person approach model of error focuses on individuals’ actions being the cause of 
error, while the system approach focuses on errors as consequences of underlying 
problems in the working environment (Reason 2000, Vincent 2010). While the 
taxonomy used highlighted both individual factors and organizational factors, 
individual factors were much easier to identify in the adverse event reports that were 
analyzed. Though many adverse event reports could potentially be interpreted as 
being due organizational causal factors, none could be concretely identified. As such, 
all of the causal factors identified in analysis of the adverse event reports were 
individual factors, playing into the person approach.  
 
This is interesting because the system approach has long been favored over the person 
approach of “shaming and blaming”, yet individual factors are still the most 
commonly identified causal factors in this paper such as memory lapse and failing to 
following guidelines and protocols. This could be an indication that individual factors 
are in fact the most common causal factors, and that error reduction need to focus at 
the individual level rather than system level. However, there are also other 
explanations for this finding.  
 
One explanation is a reporting system (Synergi) that is not designed to adequately 
capture organizational level causal factors. A reporting system designed with a 
stronger focus on capturing system levels casual factors could give a better indication 
if indeed the individual factors are the primary causes of adverse events, or if a faulty 
reporting system is to blame.  
 
Additionally, actual quality of the description of the adverse event reported could be 
liable. An increased focus on reporting all aspects of all adverse events all the time 
could lead to more organizational causal factors being identified, where they are 
maybe otherwise overlooked and forgotten in favor of spending time on other 
seemingly more important tasks. 
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6.5 Reason’s Swiss cheese model 
The data indicates that a number of factors typically contribute to an environment that 
leads to adverse events and failures in patient safety. Typically, these multi-factorial 
failures occur when one factor compounds another, leading to a third. In example, a 
nurse may be working in a busy ward, with multiple interruptions, such as additional 
patients requiring their attention, or a ringing phone, while she is trying to complete a 
patient’s discharge paperwork. At this same time, the computer that the nurse is 
attempting to complete the discharge planning documentation on may experience a 
malfunction and freeze, not allowing the nurse to complete the paperwork fully. In the 
midst of waiting for the computer to resume appropriate function, and attending to the 
other environmental interruptions, it is not uncommon for a staff member to 
experience lapses in memory upon returning to the report, or to potentially be so 
distracted upon final completion of the report, that they may submit it to the incorrect 
terminal location. 
 
This multi-factorial potential for error in patient-safety related process clearly 
demonstrates a depiction of the “Swiss Cheese” theory proposed by James Reason. 
Following Reason’s line of reasoning, it becomes evident that as an institution, there 
is significant need to implement as many defensive barriers as possible, in order to 
account for the reality of failures (holes) in some form within each barrier. Ideally, 
with enough barriers in place, there is a significant decrease in the likelihood that 
these holes/weaknesses will all line up to allow an adverse event.  
In seeking out appropriate mechanisms to develop said defensive barriers, it is 
important that these barriers are developed and focused on a system level, versus with 
individuals. While patient care occurs on individual levels, analysis of the data shows 
that most breakdowns also occur on individual levels, as caregivers are frequently 
prone to intense levels of variation, and are inherently fallible. Potential areas of 
systemic defensive barrier implementation include installing additional checks and 
required sign offs within the electronic medical record system, requirement of 
multiple individuals to sign off on a single discharge, or even something as simple as 
regularly scheduled and recurring telephonic contact, post-discharge, between 
caregivers. Further exploration and additional stakeholder interviews are necessary to 
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better determine best-practices around appropriate defensive barriers, to determine 
effective implementation strategies. 
 
6.6 Consequences of adverse events 
The majority of consequences identified throughout his study were medication 
related, due either to administration of an incorrect medication, or an incorrect 
dosage. An interesting point is that while this could seem to simply be the most 
prevalent type of error associated with adverse events, and therefore necessitate 
significant reform surround medication management in patients, it is possible that this 
is a skewed representation of actual occurrence, based on ease of identification and 
reporting. The ill effects of an incorrect type or dosage of a medication, are typically 
something that becomes apparent within a very short time from the occurrence of the 
error. This makes it easier for the involved caregivers to document and to connect to 
its origination point. Other complications (e.g. post-operative infections) are typically 
more difficult to identify, as well as to connect with their source, making their 
reporting significantly more difficult to identify as an adverse event, versus the 
occurrence of an unrelated medical event. An additional consequence no frequently 
taken into account is the significant number of patient privacy violations occurring 
with rushed caregivers mistakenly sending discharge papers to incorrect addresses or 
faxes, fostering an environment in which patient privacy is not being prioritized above 
a hectic work environment. 
 
6.7 Need for additional taxonomy development 
There is important work to be done related to the creation of a taxonomy more 
specific to patient handover events between primary and specialized healthcare 
services. While there are a number of current taxonomies related to patient safety and 
adverse event occurrence, in testing them against data specific to handover events, 
they proved unable to fully classify and identify the full breadth of causal elements 
associated with failures in patient safety. With the creation of a more specific and 
accurate taxonomy structure to better sort data related to patient handovers, it will be 
significantly easier to classify, sort and identify areas of opportunity for process 
improvement, and to learn from mistakes and prevent problems in the future.  
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7 Conclusion 
Of the results compiled through this research, most significantly it should be noted 
that through all types of adverse occurrence, the most overwhelming element 
identified as a commonality in patient safety miscarriages were those connected to 
improper or insufficient communication. This weak point in the transfer process could 
stand for substantial improvement, and with written communication identified as far 
more prevalent than spoken in medical settings, the finding of a higher incidence level 
of written communication-based errors does not necessarily indicate a higher level of 
fallibility within the communication mechanism itself, simply a bias based on 
frequency. 
 
In terms of consequences inherent to errors associated with patient transfer, the 
outcomes are severe and multi-faceted. In everything from medical errors, such as 
improper or incorrect quantities of medication being administered, to post-surgical 
infections being improperly identified, it is essential to better identify defensive 
barriers to develop at a system level, in order to better protect against oversight and 
mistakes. In addition to immediate physical impacts of discharge and transfer-based 
errors, there is also evidence to indicate that patient privacy is also an area of concern 
in transfers, with potential private health information being transmitted to incorrect 
locations, or not provided to the correct recipients. Further research is needed to gain 
more insight into additional measures that can serve to mitigate these adverse 
consequences.  
 
This research and resulting paper have served to help identify a taxonomic structure 
that can be used to identify future adverse events in handover situations, while also 
attempting to answer questions of type of event, frequency, causal elements, and 
consequences in a specific case in Norway.  
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Appendix 1 
                                                                                             
Stavanger februar 2013 
 Forespørsel om deltakelse i masterprosjektet 
 «Uønskede hendelser knyttet til samhandling og 
overganger»  
En studie av samarbeid og koordinering av tjenester mellom sykehus og kommune. 
Mitt navn er Andrea Nicole Orley, og jeg er masterstudent ved Universitet i Stavanger 
(UiS) ved institutt for helsefag. Jeg arbeider med en masteroppgave i helsevitenskap, 
«Uønskede hendelser knyttet til samhandling og overganger», under veiledning av 
professor Karina Aase ved UiS.  
Masteroppgaven er tilknyttet forskningsprosjektet ”Kvalitet og sikkerhet knyttet til 
overføring av eldre pasienter” ledet av professor Karina Aase.  Prosjektet er finansiert 
av Norges forskningsråd (NFR), Helse Vest og UiS. Prosjektet har fått tilslutning fra 
Regionale komiteer for medisinsk og helsefaglig forskningsetikk (REK) den 19.10.11 
– referansenummer 1978. I forskningsprosjektet inngår to PH. D kandidater og flere 
master studenter. 
Studiens hensikt 
Masteroppgaven har til hensikt å få en bedre forståelse over type, frekvens, årsak og 
konsekvenser av uønskede hendelser relatert til samhandling mellom primær- og 
spesialisthelsetjenester.  Oppgaven har to formål. Det ene er å analysere 
Synergimeldinger som er tilknyttet samhandling. Det andre formålet er ved hjelp av 
nøkkelintervju å belyse hvor pålitelig data fra disse rapporterte hendelser er. 
 Studien vil foregå i en stor kommune med tilknytning til et universitetssykehus, og 
ved et mindre sykehus med tilknytning til flere små kommuner. 
Hvorfor blir du forespurt om å delta? 
Du inviteres til å delta som informant i masterprosjektet mitt da ditt sykehus eller 
kommune har takket ja til å delta i forskningsprosjektet «Kvalitet og sikkerhet knyttet 
til overføring av eldre pasienter». Jeg ønsker å intervjue følgende ansatte: 
1. Synergi koordinatorer eller andre med direkte oppgaver knyttet til Synergi.   
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2. Helsepersonell som har ansvar for rapportering av uønskede hendelser knyttet til 
samhandling mellom primær- og spesialisthelsetjenester. 
I tillegg har jeg også behov for å få tilgang til de aktuelle synergimeldingene som er 
knyttet til samhandling.  Jeg håper at du vil bidra med dine erfaringer knyttet til 
samarbeid mellom sykehus og kommune, og de uønskede hendelser som oppstår i 
dette samarbeidet. Intervjuer av Synergikoordinatorer og uttak/analyse av 
Synergimeldinger planlegges gjennomført i løpet av mars og eventuelle intervjuer 
med ansatte som rapporterer samhandlingshendelser i april 2013. Det vil være 
hensiktsmessig å gjennomføre intervjuene på din arbeidsplass dersom det er mulig.   
 
Hva innebærer det for deg å delta? 
Dersom du takker ja til å delta som informant i denne studien innebærer det et 
individuelt intervju med varighet fra ca. 30-60 min. Intervjuet vil bli tatt opp på lydfil. 
Alle opplysninger som samles inn vil bli behandlet konfidensielt, det vil si uten navn 
eller andre direkte gjenkjennende opplysninger og i samsvar med regler for 
dataoppbevaring fra Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste (NSD).  Alle data som 
registreres blir slettet når prosjektet ”Kvalitet og sikkerhet knyttet til overføring av 
eldre pasienter” er sluttført innen utgangen av 2015.  Deltakerne vil bli anonymiserte 
og vil ikke identifiseres i oppgaven.  
Frivillig deltakelse 
Det er frivillig å delta i studien og du kan når som helst og uten å oppgi grunn trekke 
ditt samtykke til å delta. Dersom du takker ja vil jeg be om at du signerer den vedlagte 
samtykkeerklæringen før vi starter intervjuet. 
Dersom noe er uklart eller du ønsker mer informasjon om dette masterprosjektet kan 
du ringe eller sende e-post til: Andrea Orley, mobil 45803932, epost: 
akorley@hotmail.com 
Karina Aase professor og veileder for oppgaven ved UIS. Tlf: 51831534, epost: 
karina.aase@uis.no 
 
Med hilsen  
Andrea Orley 
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9.2 Appendix 2 
Can you briefly explain the process a synergi report goes through once it has been 
recorded in the system. 
  
Who all can report adverse events? 
 
What areas of the report are filled out by the person reporting the event? 
 -Consequences? 
 - System for sorting incident type? 
 
How adverse events handled that are directly related to coordination of care/handover 
issues? 
 - Check box for coordination?  
How long has it been an option? 
In your experience do people use correctly? (too often, not often 
enough?) 
- Are primary health care providers (general practioner, home-health nurses, 
etc.) also able to report adverse events related to coordination issues using 
synergi?  
  If so, how is the process work? 
 
What is the purpose of the reporting system.  
- What is the expected product?  
- How will the classification scheme facilitate analysis that will produce the 
desired outcome? 
What types of data are available? 
- Are reporters expected to have carried out an investigation and analysis of 
the event?  
-How detailed is the classification system? 
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9.3 Appendix 3 SAMTYKKEERKLÆRING!
INTERVJU MED ANSATTE 
Navn på student fra Universitetet i Stavanger som kan utføre intervju: Andrea Orley 
 
Jeg bekrefter at jeg har mottatt, lest og forstått skriftlig informasjon om 
masterprosjektet «Uønskede hendelser knyttet til samhandling og overganger mellom 
primær- og spesialisthelsetjeneste» og jeg takker ja til å delta i prosjektet. 
 
 
          
          JA                 
 Jeg aksepterer å bli intervjuet:                                      
 
 
Navn på deltaker: …………………………………          Dato:………….                   
Sign:…………….. 
 
 
Navn på forsker: …………………………………          Dato:………….                   
Sign:…………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
